Recent Moneyval’s evaluation on Polish AML/CFT measures

Expanded domestic cooperation framework should be introduced, so all supervisory authorities maintain efficient and risk-based supervision.

Additional mechanisms for cooperation and coordination of issues related to AML/CFT should be introduced by expanding the role of existing national platforms.

Cash control mechanisms at the border should be strengthened through the provision of a legal basis to stop, restrain or seize suspicious assets.

Additional controls and supervisory frameworks should be developed for financial institutions, virtual asset service providers (VASP’s) and designated non-financial businesses and professions to prevent the criminal control of obliged entities.

A more intensive approach should be developed to ensure consistency across the departments dealing with licensing and market entry to prevent criminals from controlling financial institutions.

Although the National AML/CFT Strategy was adopted by Poland on 19 April 2021, the overall understanding of ML and TF vulnerabilities should be strengthened.

A systemic approach should be developed and consistent action taken to align objectives and activities of competent authorities with national AML/CFT policies.

The private sector should be provided with guidance on the implementation of the recommendations of the National Risk Assessment (NRA).

The Financial Security Committee (FSC), Poland’s AML/CFT advisory and consultative body as per the Polish AML/CFT Act, should coordinate the risk-based activities of relevant authorities in order to ensure the reliability and adequacy of beneficial ownership information held in Poland.

Authorities should take actions to ensure that terrorism financing is treated as a stand-alone crime and not as a byproduct of terrorism.

Investigation of TF cases should be supported by additional guidelines and instructions. 

Financial investigations should be carried out not only in terrorism-related cases but also in cases of suspicions about the legality or destination of funds.

Training and awareness-raising initiatives should be developed for authorities, in order for them to all acquire sufficient knowledge to start and conduct a TF case on their own initiative.

Proliferation refers to spreading of weapons of mass destruction and sharing the technology or means for it’s production.

Supervisory system and sanctioning regime on PF-TFS must be urgently put in place. 

Supervisory authorities must develop responsibilities and a legal framework for monitoring compliance with PF-TFS regimes.

Private sector entities should be supported with specialized training on PF-TFS.

Registration or licensing regime for VASP’s should be created. Additionally, a legal framework which imposes penalties on such entities must be developed.

Harmonised approach for ML/TF risk assessments for virtual asset service providers (VASP) should be created.

Proper regulatory guidelines and frameworks should be established for common treatment of ML/TF risk connected to VASP’s.

It was noted that PSPs often check external sources when performing CDD to ascertain the payment, customer profile and its business activity. 

In terms of source of funds, however, it was noted that PSPs that mostly serve Polish merchants (payees), rely on banks for its verification.

It was assessed that PSPs implement similar real-time and ex-post controls to those of banks for wire transfers when processing payments;

It was observed that PSPs have implemented effective control measures and verification steps to

• ascertain the identity of the customer, 

• avoid any potential risks associated with online customer onboarding and identification processes.

Predominantly, risk seems to reside in smaller, less regulated and harder to identify PSPs, who offer more complex and sophisticated services, which was observed to hinder the traceability of transactions.

Non Profit Organizations (NPO) exposure to TF should be covered and communicated clearly to all relevant authorities and obliged entities, so there is a common understanding of risks connected.

In order to improve the NPO sector’s understanding of their exposure to TF risks the following must be developed:

• dedicated NPO sector risk assessment and guidelines, 

• targeted risk-based approach to the supervision of the NPO sector

Confiscation of proceeds of crime from ML/TF should be more decisively pursued as a policy objective by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA’s). Moreover, confiscation actions need to be consistent with ML/TF risks and national AML/CFT policies.

Consistent practice and expertise should be developed to enhance asset tracing.

Authorities should ensure that relevant statistics on seized, confiscated and returned assets are gathered and maintained.

Authorities should establish a coherent system for the handling and management of secured assets as well as the enforcement of confiscation orders.

The LEA’s should continue to expand and reinforce their operational asset tracing and asset recovery capacities through specialised training, technological solutions or expanded resources.